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ABSTRACT 
 
The study investigates the impact of corporate governance on derivatives usage in African non-
financial firms. Using a sample of 760 African non-financial firms from 17 African countries, the 
study shows that derivatives usage among African non-financial firm is very low. The study finds 
that the main reasons why most African firms do not use Derivatives are lack of knowledge about 
derivatives, absence of organized derivatives market and absence of derivatives experts. The 
results also show that Board composition is the strongest measure of corporate governance 
impacting derivatives usage. Derivatives usage increases with increase in the number of executive 
directors but has an inverse relationship with the board size. Derivatives user firms have strong 
corporate governance in place to mitigate the risk of derivatives misuse that could hurt the firms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Derivatives are financial instruments that derive 
their value from the value of other instruments. 
Just like apple juice is derived from apple fruit 
and orange juice from orange fruit, derivatives 
are derived from basic financial instruments and 
variables such as shares, bonds, treasury bills, 
interest rates, exchange rates etc. Derivatives 
can also be derived from commodities such as 
agricultural produce, precious metals, energy/oil 
and gas, power, weather condition, emission to 
mention but a few. Derivatives are basically used 
to manage risks associated with the basic 
instrument on which they have been derived. 
They can also be used for speculation and 
arbitrage. The key roles of derivatives in an 
economy include hedging, price discovery, 
market completeness, market efficiency to 
mention but a few. 
 
A derivative product can be either exchange 
traded where a contract is bought or sold on an 
organized derivative exchange or it can be over 
the counter (OTC) [1]. Exchange traded products 
have contract specification and they are 
standardized. Examples are futures contract and 
listed options. Whereas futures can only be 
traded on an exchange, options can be traded as 
an OTC or exchange traded. Forward and swaps 
are basically OTC derivatives. Fig. 1 illustrates 
this. 
 
Good corporate governance is essential to the 
working of derivatives market [2,3]. Underscoring 
the need for corporate governance on firms that 
use derivatives, [4] observes that derivatives can 
be likened to electricity which can be beneficial 
and at the same time can be harmful if not 
properly used. In that study he also relates 
derivatives to a two edged sword that must be 
handled very carefully. Hence there must be 
strong oversight over the use of derivatives by 
Management in firms and Institution where 
derivatives are used. Many cases of derivatives 
mishaps results from the wrong application of 
derivatives instruments. Some of the 
misapplication results from lack of internal 
controls and sound corporate governance [5,6]. 
Instituting sound internal controls and corporate 
governance practices in the firms that use 
derivatives will help to moderate the risk of mis-
use of derivatives. According to [7], corporate 
governance can provide mechanism to 
effectively monitor the use of derivatives.  
 
In their explanation of the concept of corporate 
Governance, [8] observe that “Corporate
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governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.  Corporate governance is the entails 
an entire network of formal and informal relations 
involving both the private and public sectors of 
the economy. It is also concerned with the 
appropriate board structures, processes and 
systems that will drive the enterprise towards the 
achievement of its set goals. To [9] in its 
broadest sense, corporate governance is 
concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between 
individual and communal goals. The governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use 
of resources and equally to require accountability 
for the stewardship of those resources. The aim 
is to align as nearly as possible the interest of 
individuals, of corporations, and of society. 
 
According to [10] “Corporate governance 
involves a set of relationship between a 
company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders”. On his 
part, [11], describes Corporate governance as 
“the process carried out by the board of directors, 
and its related committees, on behalf of and for 
the benefits of the company’s stakeholders, to 
provide direction, authority, and oversights to 
management”.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The firm’s ownership structure may have an 
effect on the desirability of hedging and 
effectively monitoring the use of derivatives [5]. 
In another study of the effects of the use of 
corporate derivatives on the foreign exchange 
rate exposure with respect to ownership of 62 
Australian Multinational Corporation, the study 
investigated the impact of the use of derivatives 
on the foreign exchange rate exposure, [12]  find 
that the percentage of shares held by block-
holders and institutions are significantly 
associated to foreign exchange exposure while 
the percentage of shares held by directors are 
not significantly associated to exposure. The 
study also finds that firm size has no significant 
effect on exposure. This position has been 
countered by [13] who studied what motivate 
banks to use derivatives in Taiwan and find that 
the propensity to use derivatives is positively 
related to bank size, currency exposure and 
issuance of preferred stocks, while negatively 
related to leverages and diversification of long 
term liabilities. A bank’s decision to use 
derivatives is related to the proportion of outside 
directors, which we have described in this study 
as the Board Composition (BC) (Please see     
Fig. 2). Less informed outsider board members 
may have concerns about derivatives use due to 
their impact on the bank’s leverage and risk 
taking. According [14], a well knowledgeable 
Board with good understanding of risk 
management can help improve derivatives use 
and enhance firm performance. In a survey of the 
understanding and monitoring of derivatives in a 
small sample of quoted firms, designed to find 
out if the non-executive directors have the 
wherewithal to oversee a firm’s derivatives 
policy, [15] find that two-thirds confessed 
inadequate knowledge of derivatives while three-
quarters favour the use of derivatives in 
appropriate circumstances. [16], find that the 
foreign currency hedging premium is statistically 
significant and economically large only for firms 
that have strong internal and external corporate 
governance. Corporate governance can provide 
mechanism to effectively monitor the use of 
derivatives [7]. Corporate governance is 
necessary for participants in the financial market 
to trust the place, product, processes, price and 
promotion offered by the market and its players.  
Since the derivatives market is considered risky, 
its modus oparandi must be characterized by 
transparency and good governance [17]. As 
stated earlier, the real issue with Global Financial 
Crises (GFC) seems to be corporate governance 
and regulatory problems. The report of [18] 
released on January 27
th
 2011, identified the 
causes of the GFC to include: widespread failure 
in financial regulation; dramatic breakdowns in 
corporate governance including too many 
financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too 
much risk; explosive mix of excessive borrowing 
and risk by households and Wall Street that put 
the financial system on a Collision course with 
crises; key policy makers ill prepared for the 
crises, lacking a full understanding of the 
financial system they oversaw; and system 
breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels 
[18]. All these issues in one way or the other 
relate to corporate governance and regulatory 
failures. 
 
According to [19], outside directors have more 
incentives to make decisions that benefit 
shareholders than do inside directors.  There are 
some findings of favorable reaction by the equity 
markets to decision made by boards with greater 
proportion of outside directors. Management, 
though skilled in running a firm in a particular 
industry, lacks the broader knowledge supplied 
by the outside directors.  In a study ‘Board 
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Composition and Corporate use of Interest Rate 
Derivatives’, [20] established a positive relation 
between the relative influence of outside 
directors and the quantity of derivatives used, 
indicating that outside directors take an active 
role in derivatives usage and that firms employ 
hedging in the shareholders best interest. The 
study also shows a significant and positive 
relation between the quantity of interest rate 
derivatives used by firms and the proportion of 
outside directors on the firm’s board. The size of 
the board, described as Board Size in our study 
(BS) has also been found not to be significantly 
related to the quantity of corporate derivatives 
use [20]. There is no evidence to suggest that 
managers benefit from corporate interest rate 
derivatives use at shareholders expense. But 
[21], argues that independent directors have not 
demonstrated any special skill to monitor or 
manage risk. According to [22], most board 
members of AIG were independent apart from 2 
of the 12-16 board members of the parent 
company. Enron had 11 independent directors 
out of the 14 board members. Also Citigroup had 
majority of its board members as independent 
and yet they accumulated toxic assets. These 
independent board members could not discover 
nor manage the excessive risk taking of their 
firms. [23], empirically show that both hedge 
funds (HF) and private equity fund (PE) 
investments is driven by corporate governance 
improvements but seem to address different 
types of agency conflicts. Hedge Funds engage 
in variety of assets classes, such as equity and 
debts, commodities, options, futures and foreign 
exchange of which activities related to publicly 
listed firms represent only a few among 
numerous strategies. Private Equities invest in 
equity investments.  The losses incurred through 
the use of derivatives by Procter and Gamble, 
Gibson Greetings and other firms and the far 
greater oversight of derivatives [20]. [24] also 
reechoes this call for greater oversight over 
derivative policies adopted by firms. But a firm’s 
risk-management policies, especially those 
pertaining to the use of derivatives should be 
strongly influenced by the policies of the Board of 
Directors [20].  
 
Earlier, [25] found that bonus payment provide 
managers an incentive to choose nonlinear 
derivatives. Smith and Watts (1992) reported       
a positive relationship between option 
compensation and investments opportunity. [26] 
believes that CEO with longer tenure develops 
skills unique to a specific firm and that makes 
them more risk averse. [27] shows that CEO’s 
age serves as a proxy for risk aversion since 
their shorter retirement horizons provide the 
incentive to reduce the variance of their 
investments portfolios, which usually consists 
heavily of their own corporations’ stocks. CEOs 
who receive more stock options have incentives 
to use nonlinear derivatives since firms generally 
award options at the money. Board of Directors 
of Corporation should carefully consider their 
firm’s optimal derivatives strategies when making 
compensation decisions (Huang et al. 2007). A 
thorough review of what went wrong during the 
Global Financial Crises reveals the need to 
reduce systematic risk or improve the efficiency 
of the derivatives markets. Also there is need for 
centralized clearing, improved price 
transparency, improved position transparency, 
migration of Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives 
trading to organized exchanges, fixing 
speculative position limits and improved 
corporate governance. But [22], believes that the 
global financial crisis was inflated by a 
combination of government policy, unscrupulous 
lending practices and financial engineering.  
According to [22], because the risks of the 
housing market had been repackaged, split into 
smaller pieces and widely distributed, the effects 
soon spread throughout the entire economy. To 
him, the financial technology that enabled the 
risk to spread included principally securitization 
but also included derivatives. It is argued that 
financial engineering techniques allow a firm to 
change rapidly its risk exposure through the use 
of derivatives, which makes its risk profile much 
less transparent and much more dynamic and 
challenging. Most firms appear to have 
inadequate internal accounting and control 
systems to track derivatives transactions on a 
timely basis. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
We use 1998 Wharton Study Survey 
methodology to study a sample of 760 non-
financial firms selected from 17 African countries. 
The 1998 survey is an extension of two previous 
surveys done in 1994 and 1995. The first survey 
was conducted in 1994 on US non-financial firms 
and published in Financial Management by [28]. 
It was later reviewed in 1996 with a broader 
range of questions about valuation and risk 
management and with more specific questions 
about the use of derivatives. One primary 
objective of the survey is the development of a 
database on risk management practices suitable 
for academic research. The model has since 
been adopted in many studies in both developed 
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and emerging market economies. For developed 
economies, the survey has been used in New 
Zealand [29], Japan [30], Sweden (1999), 
Australia [31] to mention but a few. In emerging 
market economies, the survey has been used in 
Latin America [32] in which it has been shown 
that there is a significant use of derivatives in 
financial firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico. Similar survey was used in a study in   
Peru [33], on ‘Derivatives Usage by Non-
Financial Firms in Emerging markets: The 
Peruvian Case’. In Nigeria, [34] used the 
Wharton Study Survey in their study on ‘Foreign 
Exchange Derivatives in Emerging Economies: 
Evidence from Nigeria Financial Service 
Industry’. One reason we chose to use the 
survey and Questionnaire method of data 
collection is that most African firms do not 
disclose the notional value of their derivatives 
use in their annual reports and accounts, making 
their derivatives data unavailable. This is not 
surprising because according to [28], firms are 
not willing to disclose their level of derivatives 
usage even in advanced economies with strict 
accounting rules. The second reason is that for 
virtually all African country (except South Africa), 
there is no organized derivatives exchange 
where data can be obtained on firms derivatives 
use. Thirdly it is only through a questionnaire that 
we can easily capture the motives behind the 
firms use or non-usage of derivatives, the kind of 
exposure they are managing with derivatives, 
level of derivatives knowledge and training 
among top management and board, corporate 
governance practices of the firms and Board 
monitoring of derivatives usage. Most information 
required for our analysis can only easily be 
obtained from a survey questionnaire. Even in 
advanced countries (with easy access to data) 
where this kind of study has been done, the 
researchers chose to use the survey 
methodology as it gives relevant data required 
for analysis [29,30,31]. The Wharton School 
Survey model has also been applied in cross-
country studies having been used by, to study 
the whole of Latin American Banks and by [35] in 
a single study of small and large economies. [36] 
applied the same methodology in studying 
Derivatives usage in both the United States and 
Germany. 
 
Considering the size and heterogeneity of the 
evaluated segments, a confidence band of 95% 
was used to determine the sampling dimension 
and in obtaining a valid size of 265 observations 
to represent the population and the selection 
done by random sampling. Some filter questions 
were included such as questions on perception 
on regulations and derivatives knowledge. The 
liker scale was also utilized with metric and 
dichotomous questions to analyze the variables 
as was done in the study by [33]. The study 
estimates internal consistency using Cronbach’s 
Alpha coefficient which has a value of 0.779 in a 
pilot survey. The administration of the 
questionnaires was done from July to October, 
2014. The Cronbach Alpha’s coefficient after 
receiving responses was 0.783; the final 
sampling error was calculated as 6.02% which is 
considered acceptable for the study. Logistic 
regression analysis was employed in the analysis 
of collected data. Preliminary survey results were 
analyzed using survey tabulation. This allowed 
us to compare and contrast the tendencies of the 
different variables.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Corporate governance and derivatives usage  
BS: Board Size; BC: Board Composition (Captured by No. of Executive Directors, No of Non-Executive Directors 
and No. of Independent Directors); AC: Audit Committee (Also including Risk Management Committee and 
Documented Policy on Risk Management); CG: Corporate Governance; DU: Derivatives Usage; Source: Author 
BC 
AC 
       CG DU 
BS 
 
 
 
 
Osuoha et al.; BJEMT, 8(1): 19-31, 2015; Article no.BJEMT.2015.096 
 
 
 
24 
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
Responses were received from 267 firms out of 
the 760 making up the sample. This yields a 
response rate of 35%. Two of the responses 
were considered invalid as they were not 
properly completed. This leaves us with only 265 
valid responses representing an effective 
response rate of 34.87%. The 265 valid 
responses were utilized in the analysis. The 
result on the use of derivatives in African firms as 
displayed in Table 1 above gave the overall 
percentage of firms that use derivatives as 
38.5%. 
 
Comparing the level of derivative usage last year 
with this year revealed that 68 out of the 102 
respondents (67%) whose companies use 
derivatives reported that usage increased; 10 out 
of the 102 (10%) reported decrease in usage 
while 18 out of the 102 reported that usage 
remained constant. 6 did not respond to the item. 
Please refer to Fig. 3. This is also consistent with 
Bodnar et al. [37] where derivatives usage 
increased in 42% of the firms and decreased in 
13% of the firms. The increase in usage 
suggests that firms are finding derivatives usage 
beneficial and performance-enhancing for them 
to choose to increase its usage. 
 
Table 1. Composition of respondents 
according to derivative usage 
 
Company Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Companies that 
use derivative 
102 38.5 
Companies that do 
not use derivatives  
163 61.5 
TOTAL 265 100.00 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Derivatives usage compared to last year  
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On the type of derivative usually employed by 
firms, 49 out of the 102 claimed that they 
employed forward contracts, 10 future contracts, 
20 option contracts, 15 swaps, 8 reported other 
types of derivatives. This is shown graphically in 
Fig. 4. Forwards and Swaps are purely OTC 
contracts. Options are mostly OTC but can also 
be exchange traded. The above results suggest 
that most firms in African use OTC derivatives as 
against exchange traded derivatives. This result 
is not surprising as there is no organized 
Derivatives Exchange in most African countries. 
Besides, OTC contracts are tailor made, highly 
flexible and will be considered most suitable for 
hedging activities by many firms. This is even 
true in advanced economies where there are 
derivatives exchanges. Most firms still prefer to 
use the OTC derivatives because of its flexibility 
and customization. Most firms use OTC 
derivatives to hedge their exchange rate and 
interest rate exposure because of the flexibility of 
OTC instruments. The inflexibility of Exchange 
Traded derivatives limits their usage among firms 
[32]. Firms use more of OTC derivatives because 
of the flexibility of OTC contracts. This is true in 
the US [37], UK [28], New Zealand 
in emerging market economies like Pe
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[35] and even 
ru [33]. 
4.1 Managing Exposures with Derivatives
 
Most African Firms indicate that they are mostly 
affected by exchange rate movements, followed 
by interest rate movement, then commodity price 
movement and Equity price movement. On the 
extent to which the use  of derivative instruments 
has helped to effectively manage the risk 
associated with the firm exposure to exchange 
rate, 18 reported that it extremely help, 13 
reported that it do help, 20 reported moderate 
help, 46  reported not so much while 18 repo
that it does not help. In all overwhelming majority 
of 97 out of the 102 respondents (95.10%) 
confirm that the use of derivatives has been 
helpful in managing their firms interest rate 
exposures. 
 
Regarding interest rate exposure, again an 
overwhelming majority of 95 out of 102 (93.14 %) 
confirm that the use of derivatives has been 
helpful in managing their interest rate exposure. 
The response on the interest rate revealed that 
16 reported that it extremely help, 26 that it 
helps, 42 that it moderately helps, 11 not so 
much and 7 do not improve.  
 
 
. 4. Types of derivatives in use  
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In managing commodity price exposures,  96 out 
of 102 (94.1%) confirms that it has been helpful. 
13 out of the 102 respondents reveal that 
derivatives usage extremely help commodity 
price, 55 that it do help, 12 that it moderately 
help, 16 not so much while 6 reported do not 
help.  For equity price, 94 respondents (92.16
confirm that it has been helpful in managing their 
risk exposure. The responses on equity price 
showed that 7 out of the 102 reported that it 
extremely help equity price, 42 that it do he
that it moderately help, 29 not so much and 8 do 
not help.  In all the four risk exposures examined 
in the study, overwhelming majority confirm that 
the use of derivatives has been helpful to their 
firms in managing these risk exposures 
see Fig. 5). 
 
4.2 Logistics Regression Result
 
This analysis explains the impact of Corporate 
Governance on derivatives usage. In order to 
establish the corporate governance measure with 
the greatest impact on derivative usage in firms 
covered in the study, a logistic regression was 
used in the analysis. The identified dependent 
variable was “Derivative Usage” while the other 5 
factors (Possession of Documented Policy, the 
Fig. 5. Efficiency of 
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Board Size, Number of executive directors, 
number of non – executive directors and number
of independent directors) were the independent 
variables. The output of the SPSS recorded the 
resulting values for each of the 265 observations 
in the survey (Please see Table 1a in 
Appendix 1).  
 
The statistics – 2 log likelihood reduces with 
each iteration; thus making the model a better 
one. The model summary on Table 1
1) gives that the model accounts for between 
55.7% and 75.9% of the variance in derivative 
usage. Table 1c (Appendix 1) summarizing the 
result of our prediction gave that
correctly predicts the outcome for 86.6%. 
Therefore we have correctly predicted 77.9% of 
derivative usage by the corporate governance 
measures. Table 1d (Appendix 1) gave some of 
the most useful information. The first column 
gives the co-efficients for each predictor variable 
in the model. The negative coefficients for board 
size indicate that derivative usage decrease with 
the rise in the number of directors. This findings 
tallies with an earlier study where it was found 
that the size of the board (BS) was found not to 
be significantly related to the quantity of 
corporate derivatives use [20]. 
 
 
managing exposures through derivatives  
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The Wald Statistics and the associated sig 
values indicate that only number of executive 
directors is significant. Conclusively after a step 
wise procedure which ensured the best selection 
of variables, the result showed that the most 
significant relationship is between derivative use 
and board composition (especially the number of 
executive directors). This finding may not be 
surprising to many scholars. Experience in the 
corporate world suggests that a board dominated 
by executive directors will have higher appetite 
for risk, which may result to engaging in more 
risky projects that may require the need to use 
derivatives to hedge such exposures. A board 
dominated by non-executive directors may 
moderate risk taking, encourage less risky 
projects that could lead to minimizing the need to 
use derivatives. This suggests that the present 
Board structure prevalent in most African firms 
and  other markets based on the agency theory 
principles of corporate governance; where there 
are more non- executive directors than executive 
directors may be contributing to the low level of 
usage of derivatives. Most corporate governance 
codes do encourage a board structure with more 
non-executive directors. It is believed that such 
structure will be more effective in monitoring 
board’s use of derivatives. To encourage 
increased use of derivatives, there may be need 
to revisit corporate governance codes of practice 
across African countries. This findings 
contradicts the finding in a study “Board 
Composition & Corporate use of Interest rate 
Derivatives” by [20] in which it was found that 
there exist a significant and positive relation 
between the quantity of derivatives usage by 
firms and the proportion of outside directors on 
the Board. In a survey of the understanding and 
monitoring of derivatives in a small sample of 
quoted firms, the survey was designed to find out 
if the non-executive directors have the where 
withal to oversee a firm’s derivatives policy.  
Two-thirds of the non- directors confessed 
inadequate knowledge of derivatives; three 
quarters favoured the use of derivatives in 
appropriate circumstances [38]. This lack of 
knowledge of derivatives among non-executive 
directors may be responsible for low use of 
derivatives by firms dominated by non-executive 
directors as they cannot give what they don’t 
have. Just like [22] argues that Independent 
Directors have not demonstrated any special skill 
to manage risk. In all, the presence of good 
corporate governance will help firms gain 
maximally from their corporate derivatives usage.  
As observed by [15], foreign currency hedging 
premium is statistically significant and 
economically large for firms that have strong 
internal and external corporate governance. [39] 
also show that firms with strong corporate 
governance use derivatives in beneficiary ways 
to the firm. One of the most important aspects of 
derivatives control is Board- level approval 
(Grant& Marshall [34]). 
 
5. CONCLUSION / SUMMARY OF 
FINDINGS 
 
Considering the nature of derivatives, its two 
edged sword nature that can be defensive and at 
the same time harmful, its electricity nature that 
can transform and at the same time can deform if 
misused [5], as well as the possibility of misuse, 
there is need to establish a sound system of 
corporate governance in firms and economies 
that use or plan to introduce derivatives across 
their markets, as in the case of Africa. Good 
corporate governance will help moderate the risk 
of derivatives misuse in Africa financial markets. 
From our study the board composition mostly 
influence derivatives usage among African firms 
while board size has an inverse relationship with 
derivatives usage. These both show that the 
corporate governance practice, board structure, 
composition and size do affect firms’ decision to 
use derivatives. African firms that use derivatives 
must strive to support their derivative usage with 
strong corporate governance to avoid cases of 
derivatives misuse that could hurt the firm 
severely. We can summarize the findings which 
have been discussed above as follows: 
 
1.  Derivatives usage by African non-financial 
firms is very low at 38.5% and the three 
major factors attributed to the low usage are 
lack of knowledge about derivatives, 
absence of organized derivatives market and 
absence of derivatives experts. 
2. Large African firms tend to use derivatives 
much more than small firms. The rate of 
Derivatives usage among large firms is 54% 
while 19% of small firms use derivatives. 
3. Over the Counter Derivatives is much more 
in use just like in many other studies. The 
flexibility and customized nature of OTC 
derivatives may have been responsible for 
this trend. 
4. A large percentage of the firms (67%) are 
increasing their derivatives usage suggesting 
that they may be finding derivatives 
beneficial and effective in managing their 
risks, which motivates them to increase its 
usage 
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5. Board Composition is the most significant 
Corporate Governance measure that affects 
African firms’ use of derivatives. However, 
derivatives usage decreases with rise in the 
board size but increase with rise in the 
number of executive directors. 
6. Most African firms that use derivatives have 
strong corporate governance in place to 
check and monitor derivatives usage. Most 
have in place and Audit Committee (AC) and 
particularly a Risk Management Committee 
(RMC) that oversees risk management and 
derivatives usage within the firm. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 1. Logistic regression 
 
Table 1A. Case processing summary 
 
Unweighted cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected cases Included in analysis 65 24.5 
Missing cases 200 75.5 
Total 265 100.0 
Unselected cases 0 .0 
Total 265 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. b. The category variable item 19a is 
constant for the selected cases. Since a constant term was specified, the variable will be removed from the 
analysis 
 
Case processing summary 
Unweighted casesa N Percent 
Selected cases Included in analysis 228 86.0 
Missing cases 37 14.0 
Total 265 100.0 
Unselected cases 0 .0 
Total 265 100.0 
a) If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases 
 
Table 1B. Model summary 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R square Nagelkerke R square 
1 116.506
a
 .557 .759 
a) Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution 
cannot be found 
 
Table 1C. Classification Tablea 
 
 Observed Predicted 
item1a Percentage correct 
yes no  
Step 1 item1a Yes 67 19 77.9 
No 7 135 95.1 
Overall percentage   88.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Table 1D. Variables in the equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a POLICY(1) -23.884 4391.047 .000 1 .996 .000 
BS a   .084 3 .994  
BS(1) -22.344 22910.782 .000 1 .999 .000 
BS(2) -22.057 4391.047 .000 1 .996 .000 
BS(3) -21.822 4391.047 .000 1 .996 .000 
BCa -.260 .121 4.589 1 .032 .771 
BCb -.070 .093 .557 1 .455 .933 
BCc -.265 .191 1.929 1 .165 .767 
Constant 26.693 4391.047 .000 1 .995 3.914E11 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: item15a, item17a, item17ba, item17bb, item17bc. 
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